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 Carl Schmitt and the American Century 
Abstract 
During the past two decades or so, Carl Schmitt (1888-1985) has been read both as a 
mediated source of intellectual influence on the mainstream American Right, and as a radical 
critic of dominant US foreign policy discourses. This article offers an analytical 
reconstruction of Schmitt’s interpretation of American foreign policy on the backdrop of this 
apparent paradox in the reception of his legacy.  Through an engagement with a wide range of 
well-known and less well-known texts, the study draws particular attention to the 
philosophical prisms through which Schmitt came to conceptualise the relationship between 
technology, political violence and ‘values’ in the formulation of American foreign policy 
during the second half of the twentieth century.   Although this is a more sinuous path to 
Schmitt’s international political thought, it provides an understanding of his antagonism 
towards America that goes beyond the atavistic nostalgia of his own politics, and generates 
apposite insights into the webs of confused categories concerning war, space and historical 
time hardwired in the normative fabric of the so-called ‘American century’.   
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This article offers an exegesis of the US foreign policy narrative nested in the political 
thought of the German jurist Carl Schmitt (1888-1985).  Along with his friend Martin 
Heidegger (1889-1976), Schmitt is one of the most controversial thinkers of the 
twentieth century.  His career as a legal theorist and public intellectual defies the sort 
of short, snappy introduction that has come to be expected of academic writers in our 
contemporary publishing culture.  So let me instead begin by stating the obvious. 
Unlike many other writers who left a mark on the intellectual history of 
American foreign policy during the twentieth century, Schmitt never had any insider’s 
understanding of the US foreign policy making process.  Schmitt experienced US 
foreign policy at the receiving end.  After being arrested and then released by the Red 
Army in Berlin in April 1945, he was arrested again by the Americans at the end of 
September and detained in various camps as a potential defendant for participation in 
a ‘conspiracy to wage aggressive war’ at the proceedings of the Nuremberg 
International Military Tribunal.  According to one of his political biographers, ‘the 
decision to interrogate him at Nuremberg was largely due to the infamous reputation 
he had acquired abroad . . . as the “Crown Jurist” of the Third Reich and the theorist 
of Nazi expansionism’.1  Schmitt owed this mythical reputation in great part to 
Frankfurt School intellectuals Franz Neumann, Otto Kirchheimer and Herbert 
Marcuse, who fled the Nazi regime during the interwar period and found refuge in the 
United States.  During the war, the Research and Analysis Branch of the U.S. Office 
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of Strategic Services (a precursor to the CIA) recruited the three Marxist scholars to 
help them understand the Nazi state.2  After the war, Neumann became Chief of 
Research for Justice Robert H. Jackson, the chief prosecutor for the United States at 
Nuremberg.  He personally made sure that Schmitt was detained, and that he was 
confronted by his friend and colleague in charge of the interrogations for the 
Americans, the German-born Jewish American lawyer Robert Kempner. 
Being the vain and opportunist scholar that he was, Schmitt made no effort at 
downplaying the significance that his work had on German intellectual debates since 
the 1920s.  But he dismissed all suggestions that he had any close direct contact with 
those within the Nazi executives who planned and conducted the war.  As he wrote in 
his reply to Kempner and his team:   
 
This is no place to expand upon the general situation of a university professor in a totalitarian 
system.  Enough to say here that it was impossible for a chair in jurisprudence to be regarded 
as a decisive position or as a basis for exercising a decisive influence at decisive points in 
Hitler’s totalitarian system, given its prevailing conception of science, education and 
jurisprudence… Theories and ideas do have influence, but this influence is not traceable to 
“decisive points”.3    
 
Schmitt never stood trial.  But although he did indeed have nothing to do with 
the planning of the war and never succeeded in exercising ‘decisive’ influence over 
official Nazi legal theory, we know for a fact that the professor’s involvement with 
the Nazis went well beyond the abstractions of academic debates.  Schmitt joined the 
Nazi Party in 1933 and remained a member until the very end.  Under the patronage 
of Herman Göring and Hans Frank, he was appointed to the Prussian State Council 
and became Director of the Berlin Faculty branch of the National Socialist Lawyers’ 
Association (NSLA), where he also received a professorship.  In June 1934, Schmitt 
was also appointed editor-in-chief of the Nazi news organ for lawyers, the Deutsche 
Juristen-Zeitung.  In these different roles, he assisted with the drafting of Nazi 
legislation, contributed to the handling of various legal-administrative questions, and 
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defended the extra-judicial executions of Hitler’s political rivals within the Nazi 
movement.4   
Then when he began to lose influence after his denunciation for lack of 
ideological convictions by SS fanatics in 1936, Schmitt made a series of pathetic 
public interventions designed to draw attention to his commitment to anti-Semitism 
and official Nazi philosophy.  His anxieties during this period can be read between the 
lines of his 1938 Leviathan in the State Theory of Thomas Hobbes: Meaning and 
Failure of a Political Symbol.  After the war, Schmitt even claimed that the book was 
a form of esoteric resistance in which he used the Englishman as a mouthpiece to 
express his own subdued disappointment about Nazi orthodoxy.5  There is probably 
some truth in this.  After all, Schmitt’s Weimar writings always had more affinities 
with the fascist tradition exemplified by Maurras, Gentile, Mussolini and Franco than 
with the racially based totalitarianism of German National Socialism.6  But this is 
precisely the point.  To the extent that his political and legal theory differed or 
deviated from official Nazi doctrines, there never was anything in there that could 
have served as a significant bulwark against a racist, totalitarian Nazi appropriation.7  
But this does not really go to the bottom of things.  For along with the 
reactionary tirades and revolting anti-Semitic tracts, Schmitt is also the author of 
some of the most thought provoking legal and political treatises written in the 
twentieth century.  After being banned from post-war academic life, Schmitt went on 
to live a secluded life in his native town of Plettenberg.  From there, he became a key 
background figure in the intellectual debates of the Federal German Republic, and 
published a number of important studies on various subjects including political 
theology, asymmetrical warfare and the emerging Cold War order.  By far the most 
significant of these is his Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus 
Publicum Europaeum, which he wrote in the early 1940s but was only allowed to 
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publish in 1950.8  In contemporary discourse, the Greek term ‘nomos’ is usually 
translated as ‘law’, ‘norm’ or ‘regulation’.  But Schmitt uses it in its original spatial 
meaning to designate the concrete division and redistribution of the earth that grounds 
public and international law in any historical period.  Although certainly not without 
its suspicious omissions and analytical shortcomings, Schmitt’s Nomos is an erudite 
account of the rise and fall of the modern Eurocentric global order, which concludes 
with a deeply critical analysis of the prospects for a new world order grounded in 
American power.  
For obvious reasons, Schmitt’s Nomos has been largely ignored in the Anglo-
Saxon world during the entire duration of the Cold War.  However, the collapse of 
communism and the subsequent attacks of 9/11 have breathed new life into his 
analyses, generating an important new wave of secondary literature and translations 
of his works into English.9   Along the way, observers have also identified important 
affinities between Schmitt’s critique of liberalism and the confrontational style of 
‘friend and enemy’ politics pursued by the American Right at home and abroad over 
the past few decades.  This controversial issue of lineage is to do mainly with the 
influence exercised by conservative European immigrants and German Jewish 
refugees such as Joseph Schumpeter, Friedrich von Hayek and Leo Strauss, who in all 
sorts of complex and mediated ways acted as an intellectual ‘transmission belt’ 
between the authoritarian milieu of interwar Europe and neoconservative critiques of 
the liberal state.10   
Within the discipline of International Relations, intellectual historians have also 
drawn attention to the important formative influence that Schmitt exercised on the 
young Hans Morgenthau.  As we know, Morgenthau sought refuge in America during 
the interwar period and went on to become one of the leading figures of the post-war 
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realist tradition.11  Schmitt’s subterranean presence in realist circles during the 
following decades was also ensured by George D. Schwab, the American foreign 
policy expert of Latvian-Jewish descent with whom Morgenthau founded the National 
Committee on American Foreign Policy (NCAFP) in 1974. The NCAFP is a centre-
right think tank dedicated to the advancement of American foreign policy interests 
‘from a nonpartisan perspective within the framework of political realism’.12  Schwab 
has been the director since the early 1990s.  In his functions as the English-language 
executor of the Schmitt Estate, he has translated three of Schmitt’s most important 
works, and published the first overview of his political philosophy in the English-
speaking world in 1970.13  Schwab has also been instrumental to the intriguing 
transformation of Paul Piccone’s influential academic journal Telos since the late 
1980s, from a New Left vehicle for the dissemination of Frankfurt School Critical 
Theory in the US into an outlet for forgotten or repressed critics of mainstream 
liberalism on both sides of the political spectrum – Schmitt being the most significant 
of them.  The other prominent Schmitt scholar who contributed to this transformation 
is the leading ‘paleoconservative’ intellectual historian of American conservatism 
Paul Gottfried.   Gottfried was a close friend of Richard Nixon, and has been a long-
time political adviser to Pat Buchanan. 
In sum, what has become clear to us during the past two decades or so is that 
Schmitt’s oeuvre is much more important to the intellectual history of American 
political thought than it was ever thought to be – both as a mediated source of 
influence and as vehicle for radical criticism.  In what follows, I reconstruct Schmitt’s 
interpretation of US foreign policy with an eye to this ambivalence structuring the 
reception of his legacy in the English-speaking world.   The analysis draws particular 
attention to the philosophical prisms through which Schmitt came to conceptualise the 
relationship between technology, political violence and universal ‘values’ during the 
second half of the twentieth century.   Although this is a somewhat more sinuous path 
to Schmitt’s international political thought, it provides an understanding of his 
antagonism towards America that goes beyond the atavistic nostalgia of his own 
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politics, and generates apposite insights into the webs of confused categories 
concerning war, space and historical time hardwired in the normative fabric of the 
‘American century’.  
 
Of States, Wars and Sea Monsters  
Our main point of entry into Schmitt’s reading of American foreign policy is the 
aforementioned 1938 book on Hobbes.  For although America is rarely ever 
mentioned in it, much of the conceptual framework that Schmitt brings to bear on his 
analyses of US foreign policy in subsequent studies is laid out here in his discussion 
of Hobbesian political theory.    
As the title suggests, Leviathan in the State Theory of Thomas Hobbes: 
Meaning and Failure of a Political Symbol is a critical assessment of the 
achievements and failures of Hobbesian political theory from the not so contextual 
perspective of the turbulent 1930s.  In the first instance, the book presents Hobbes’s 
Leviathan as the most creative and influential justification of the absolutist political 
order that prevailed between the mid-17th century and the 19th century – the so-called 
Jus Publicum Europaeum.  In ideal typical form, the Jus Publicum Europaeum was a 
re-organisation of European public space into two clearly separated domains: a 
domain of political authority reserved for the sovereign and governed by the principle 
of raison d’état, and a subordinate domain of apolitical subjects where culture, 
morality and commerce developed according to their own immanent principles.  As a 
symbolic representation of this European order, Schmitt argues that Hobbes’s 
Leviathan ‘achieved its highest degree of mythical force’ by ensuring the preservation 
of an external space where sovereign states could affirm their ‘force and vitality’ 
against one another, and remind their subjects of the ‘reasons’ why the state was 
created in the first place.14  The absorption of all rationality and legality by the 
absolutist state meant that those who faced one another as enemies no longer did so as 
religious foes, but as states and according to the secular dictates of raison d’état: 
‘Wars become pure wars between states’.  It follows from this that one could no 
longer talk of just and unjust wars between states since the juridical categories of the 
system of international law no longer took their bearing from a transcendent theology, 
but from the concept of the state and its immanent ethics of raison d’état: ‘Ordo hoc 
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non includit.  The state has its order in, not outside, itself’.15   
Schmitt considers this de-moralisation of warfare as one of the great humanising 
achievements of the age of absolutism.  This is because war fighting took place on the 
basis of a clear distinction between civilians and combatants, and combat was 
operationalized on the basis of a strict hierarchical chains of command.  Wars had to 
be lawfully declared; and they could be ended with formal peace treaties because their 
aims were of limited and primarily material character.  To be sure, none of this applied 
in the Americas or anywhere beyond the European continent, where European powers 
showed little restraint towards non-white civilian populations and in their conflicts 
with one another.  And even within Europe, the ideal of ‘bracketed, cabinet warfare’ as 
a gentlemanly duel was just that – i.e. an ideal that was routinely ignored and violated.  
But what fascinated Schmitt is that this ideal of limited, regulated warfare was upheld 
in the first place. 
And yet, Schmitt argues that it is precisely the absence of a genuinely 
transcendent political theology in the Hobbesian concept of the state that would 
eventually lead to the decline of the absolutist order.16   The crux of the argument is 
that Hobbes’s Leviathan owes its demise to the strict separation between morality 
proper and the self-referential ethics of the state upon which it was erected.  Under the 
doctrine of raison d’état, the absolutist state took leave from traditional moral norms 
and subordinated all religious and rational claims of individual morality to political 
necessity.  But in doing so, it created a foothold for the emergence of a private realm 
autonomous from the state where a well-financed and intellectually influent civil 
society would grow and acquire a monopoly on ‘morality proper’.  Because Hobbes 
considered freedom from politics to be the ultimate moral good, he could not have 
conceived that the emergence of a bourgeois civil society could be a potential political 
threat to the state.  Yet, it is precisely this moral rejection of politics that established a 
comfortable critical vantage point from which the immoral substance of the absolutist 
order would eventually be put into question by a civil society emancipated from the 
state of nature.   For as the secularizing process continued to unfold in the 17th, 18th 
and 19th centuries, the new bourgeois public sphere progressively turned its attention 
away from religion and began to exercise its critical spirit on earthly matters.  It slowly 
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extended itself into politics through legal criticism enunciated from within the realm of 
government, until it eventually turned against the state itself. 
Schmitt argues that Hobbes’s Leviathan fell short of serving its ordering 
function because its mythical element failed to establish a clear political distinction 
between ‘us and them’ and ‘friend and enemy’, which transcends the public–private 
distinction and cultivates the cultural homogeneity of the political community.   
Schmitt’s suggestion is that the heterogeneous elements of ‘society’ could only be 
maintained as long as the ‘civil society versus state’ line of enmity existed.  When this 
strict opposition progressively dissolved, enlightenment criticism failed to reconcile 
its anti-political morality with the amorality of the political realm.  As a mode of 
social integration, moral critique could not succeed without succumbing to the 
autonomy and primacy of the political: ‘The old adversaries, the “indirect” powers of 
the church and of interest groups, reappeared in that century as modern political 
parties, trade unions, social organizations, in a phrase, as “forces of society” […] The 
institutions and concepts of liberalism became weapons and power positions in the 
hands of the most illiberal forces’.17    
But that is not all.  According to Schmitt, Hobbes’s poor ‘mythological sense’ 
had led him to choose a sea monster over the terrestrial monster Behemoth to capture 
the symbolic essence of his treatise on the sovereign territorial state.  Hobbes’s 
confused choice of biblical creature reflected his blindness to the political passage 
from land to sea that was in the process of transforming England since the Elizabethan 
era.  As Schmitt points out, the Hobbesian ideal of the state realised itself on the 
continent, mainly in France and in Prussia, but never in England: ‘The English Isle 
and its world-conquering seafaring needed no absolute monarchy, no standing land 
army, no state bureaucracy, no legal system of a law state such as became 
characteristic of continental states… the English people withdrew from this kind of 
closed states and remained “open”’. 18  Those who created the British Empire were 
privateers (individuals who considered maritime violence a private matters), 
commercial adventurers, immigrants and other social forces associated with the 
Puritan revolution, and who found in colonial expansion a means to escape from the 
hierarchical politics of statehood. 
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According to Schmitt, this would in great part account for the indirect methods, 
channels and means by which British sovereignty came to be exercised in the world: 
Free Masonry, liberal constitutionalism, industrialism and other such consequences 
and by-products of Britain’s de-territorialised relationship to machinery and techne.  
As the earth came to be increasingly envisaged from the perspective of the sea, a 
‘virtual geography’ transmuted itself into a genuine ‘political reality’ completely 
antithetical to continental political and juridical institutions.  Unlike the continental 
order, which rested on closed delimitated spaces, the sea would remain free and 
opened to commercial and war-making activities.   It would ‘belong to nobody, or 
everybody, but in reality, it would belong to a single country: England’.19  And as 
Schmitt is keen to point out, these basic spatial premises also generated two 
antithetical conceptions of warfare and enmity:   
 
[T]he naval wars were based on the idea of the necessity of treating the enemy’s trade and 
economy as one. Hence the enemy was no longer the opponent in arms alone, but every 
inhabitant of the enemy nation, and ultimately every neutral country that had economic links 
with the enemy. Land warfare implied a decisive confrontation in the field. While not 
excluding naval combat, the maritime war, on the other hand, favored such characteristic 
means as bombardment, the blockade of the enemy shores, and the capture of enemy and neu-
tral merchantmen in virtue of the right to capture.20 
 
Schmitt dates the official disintegration of the Jus Publicum Europaeum to the 
great scramble for Africa and the Congo Conference of 1885.  The subsequent Hague 
Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907 marked the transition from a Eurocentric world 
order to one rooted in the spacelessness of an abstract, general universalism.  By then, 
the industrial revolution had completely ‘transformed the children of the sea into 
machine-builders and servants of machines’.21  For Schmitt, however, the end of the 
British hegemony, the First World War, decolonization, and the establishment of the 
League of Nations did not so much mark the expansion of the European state system 
to the rest of the world as its superseding by a new Großräume order driven by the 
rise of American power.  
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America and the Großräum Order 
Schmitt’s concept of Großräume refers to the geographical delimitation of a state’s 
special ‘sphere of interests’, or ‘zone of security’, extending way beyond its legal 
territorial borders. The politics of Großräume would therefore be a politics of 
supranational formations, in which the globe would be divided among a small number 
of hegemonic powers seeking to guarantee the integrity and independence of 
subordinate states on the basis of their political homogeneity.22  Schmitt would come 
to read the Second World War in this optic as the first war for the organisation of 
planetary space, the meaning and significance of which he did not see in the fight 
against Soviet Russia but in the struggle against Great Britain and Roosevelt’s 
America.   
Like many analysts at the time, Schmitt understands the dissolution of the 
colonial empires to be an implicit motive for the United States late entry into the war 
in December 1941.  He traces the intellectual origins of this grand strategy in the 
writings of the American Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840-1914).  In July 1894, 
Mahan published an article in which he explored the possibility of a re-unification 
between Great Britain and the United States.  Mahan considered racial, linguistic and 
cultural commonalities to be important sources of motivations.  But for him it was 
geography and the need for Anglo-Saxon geopolitical security that provided the 
primary rationale: ‘In the evolving modern world, England had grown too small’.  
Just as Disraeli had proposed to displace the seat of the declining Empire from 
London to Delhi in the 1840s, Mahan now saw America as ‘the larger island, through 
which the British mastery of the seas would be perpetuated as an Anglo-American 
maritime dominion of the world on a larger scale’.23  For the Admiral, the old 
continental conception of the ‘Western hemisphere’ at the heart of the Monroe 
Doctrine had run its course.  The time had come to move towards the pacific and 
submit vast new spaces to the new ‘open door’ policy of the United States.      
The originality of Schmitt’s analysis lies in the metaphysical significance that 
he reads into this betrayal of the Monroe Doctrine.  In his 1941 book Völkerrechtliche 
Großraumordnung (The Regional Order in International Law), Schmitt 
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controversially argues that ‘[t]he 1823 Monroe Doctrine was in the recent history of 
international law the first and to date most successful example of a regional 
[Großraum] international law. That is the real precedent for the German Reich’.24  
Originally formulated by John Quincy Adam (1767-1848), the Monroe Doctrine 
stipulated that no more colonisation and extension of the European system would be 
allowed anywhere in the Western hemisphere.  In guise of reciprocity, the US would 
not interfere with the existing European colonies in the New World or with the 
internal affairs of European nations.25  The Monroe doctrine thus established the basis 
of a world based on two geopolitical ‘spheres of influence’ transcending existing 
regimes of state sovereignty.  It also affirmed the Western hemisphere as a US regime 
of freedom, justice, peace, virtue and self-determination against the old and morally 
corrupted order of European absolutism.  According to Schmitt, the goal of this 
negative identification with the ‘old occident’ was not to fragment or ‘dethrone’ the 
idea of the occident as such, but to take its place as the main ‘axis of world history 
and centre of the world’.26  Through this expansionist act of geopolitical isolation, the 
Monroe Doctrine limited European presence in the Western hemisphere and 
preserved the independence to act unilaterally, conquer and settle the remaining parts 
of the West. 
In light of the parliamentary corruption and degeneracy of European absolutism 
during the eighteenth century, and given the servile character of the post-Napoleonic 
reaction and restoration during the nineteenth century, America appeared to stand a 
real chance of becoming the more authentic representative of the European ideal.  As 
Schmitt points out, after the bourgeois revolutions of 1848, thousands of disillusioned 
intellectuals and political activists fled the old reactionary continent and immigrated 
to America in the hope of finding a more receptive audience for their transformative 
visions.27  In concrete geopolitical terms, however, the pronouncement of the Monroe 
Doctrine in 1823 was of limited significance.  For the United States neither had the 
navy nor the military power to enforce such an ambitious policy pronouncement.  It 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Carl Schmitt, Völkerrechtliche Großraumordnung (Berlin: Deutscher Rechtsverlag, 1941), p. 13. My 
translation.   
25  Bradford Perkins, The Creation of a Republican Empire: 1776-1865 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1993), pp. 147-169. 
26 Carl Schmitt, ‘Changement de structure du droit international’, in La Guerre Civile Mondiale. Essais 
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went relatively unnoticed abroad for the best part of the nineteenth century, and was 
randomly violated by European powers at several occasions.  By the time America 
had acquired the maritime capability to enforce its declared Großräume at the turn of 
the century, optimistic beliefs about the novelty, liberty and possibilities of the 
Western hemisphere had all but completely disappeared.   
In line with contemporary Marxist theories, Schmitt argues that the opening of 
new imperialist horizons towards Asia under Roosevelt was inexorably linked to a 
domestic contraction of economic opportunities.  Schmitt invokes John Dewey’s 
appropriation of Frederick Jackson Turner’s famous ‘frontier thesis’.28  The frontier 
thesis argued that many of the dominant attributes of American culture like 
individualism, democracy and civic nationalism had been made possible and 
depended on Westward expansion across the American continent.29  The early success 
and wide appeal of American democracy was predicated on the abundant availability 
of cheap agricultural land, and on the interpretation of democratic freedom as the 
freedom to own and accumulate property unimpaired by government.  This allowed 
for a relatively high level of social mobility, which in turn strengthened the belief that 
individual effort leads to individual achievement. It also helped account for the 
perception of a situation of relatively widespread economic equality in the United 
States compared to Europe during the 18th and 19th century.  But this period came to 
an end with the closing of the Western frontiers in the early 1890s. America’s ‘living 
space’ was now limited and could no longer rely on this geographical safety valve to 
guarantee its continued stability and prosperity: 
 
At this moment, America’s nomos – i.e. the foundations of all social and legal relations – 
changed completely…  More rapidly than anyone could have anticipated, the new Europe was 
transformed into a vulgar and enlarged image of the old one.  The social question, problems 
of demographics, race, unemployment and political freedoms – all presented themselves as in 
Europe but on a much larger scale and with ten times the intensity.30 
 
Although there was relatively little disagreement within the economic and 
political elites that expansion was necessary, this expansion had to be formulated in 
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29 Frederick Jackson Turner, ‘The Significance of the Frontier in American History’ (1893), re-printed 
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ways that did not offend the cultural tradition of liberty, self-determination and 
progress so central to discourses of American identity. Roosevelt did this by 
‘exploiting the Monroe Doctrine and using it as a pretext to promote a particularly 
rude form of liberal capitalist “dollar diplomacy”’.31  Roosevelt’s dollar diplomacy 
was anchored in a broader foreign policy vision characterised by an unstable mixture 
of progressive and social-Darwinian concerns over the debilitating consequences of 
mass consumerism on American society.32  These tensions found expression in his 
exaltation of martial virtues and his belief that America had an obligation to use its 
growing military and industrial capability to develop and modernize the ‘wasted 
spaces’ of the earth in the interest of humanity as a whole. As he told a crowd in a 
famous speech shortly after his inauguration: ‘Chronic wrongdoing may in America, 
as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation, and in the 
Western Hemisphere the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may 
force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or 
impotence, to the exercise of an international police power’.33 
According to Schmitt, the ‘Roosevelt corollary’ to the Monroe Doctrine rested 
on a dual conflation of practices that had very significant implications for the exercise 
of American foreign policy in the twentieth century.  The first concerns the merging of 
two sets of political commitments that are both geographically and normatively 
antithetical to one another.  Whereas the Monroe Doctrine is based on an authentic 
notion of space implying concrete limitations, dollar diplomacy has nothing but 
contempt for spatial boundaries:  
 
The sanctified tradition of always being the country of free land is underpinned by a 
consequent isolationism.  Yet the imperial reality of economic ambitions in world commerce 
calls for unlimited universal intervention.  The traditional separation of commerce from 
politics  – as much commerce as possible and as little politics as possible – has lost its inner 
truth because, in the long run, there cannot be any world commerce without world politics.34 
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What is really important for Schmitt in these developments is the shift in the 
ethico-political disposition that characterises America’s act of self-isolation from the 
rest of the world.   Many other peoples, states and empires have in the past sought to 
draw defensive geopolitical lines to quarantine themselves from external 
contaminations.  Schmitt draws attention to the Great Wall of China and the Pillars of 
Hercules flanking the entrance to the Straight of Gibraltar as examples of such 
symbolic frontiers.  What is different with the Roosevelt corollary is that the 
defensive and spatially demarcated line of self-retrenchment constitutive of the 
Monroe Doctrine mutates into its opposite – i.e. a spaceless, offensive line of 
discrimination against the rest of the world that demands integration and adherence to 
a substantively prescribed normative order.35  
Wilsonian liberal internationalism, with its encouragement to ‘all the peoples of 
the world’ to adopt the right to self-determination, was a logical extension of the 
Roosevelt corollary.  This was followed by the Stimson Doctrine of 1932, which 
reiterated America’s right to deny recognition to any state or government anywhere in 
the world that did not come to power through ‘legitimate’ means.  It did so, for 
example, by maintaining the convention of recognizing not states but only 
governments considered ‘lawful’ according to the United States own understanding of 
legality.  The Stimson doctrine was pronounced on the juridical basis of the Kellog-
Briand Pact of 1928 and the covenant of the League of Nations.   In this same 
discriminatory spirit, the League not only appropriated the universal right to 
determine which side of a conflict was ‘just and unjust’, but also claimed the authority 
to impose this decision on all neutral parties.  The move was facilitated by a 
discursive re-articulation of interstate conflicts in terms of a series of oppositions 
between the League’s ‘pacifying interventions’ and the ‘crimes’ and ‘terrorism’ of its 
opponents.  And because no one can remain neutral in the face of terror and crime, the 
League effectively transformed the pacific concept of neutrality into a concept of 
war.36  
This is the other main source of Schmitt’s resentment against American foreign 
policy.  For the jurist, ‘police’ refers to the legitimate use of force by the sovereign 
state to secure the domestic order.  It must not be conflated with the activity of 
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warfare occurring strictly between sovereigns: ‘War in this system of international 
law is a relationship of one order to another order, and not from order to disorder.  
This relationship of order to disorder is “civil war”’.37  Schmitt traces the origins of 
this criminalization of war to the American entry into the Second World War.  In the 
Nomos, he quotes specifically from the March 31, 1941 proclamation of Justice 
Jackson, the then US attorney general, who explicitly confirmed the change from an 
older understanding of war to a new order where aggression will be punished.38  
Schmitt sees important parallels between these developments and the theological just 
war tradition that had been abandoned with the emergence of the Jus Publicum 
Europaeum.39  Yet against the opinion of the American jurist James Brown Scott, he 
insists that the emergence of this new discriminatory conception of war should be 
seen as a completely new ideological phenomenon associated with the industrial-
technological development of late-modern means of destruction:  
 
This is not the ‘just’ war of Middle-Ages theologians, of which spoke Vittoria and, under his 
influence, Grotius and the internationalists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.  This 
attempt at eliminating one’s political adversary by portraying him as a criminal and the 
ultimate obstacle to world peace is radically new because it embraces the whole world… By 
claiming not only the right to defend itself against a political adversary, but also the right to 
disqualify and slander this adversary from the point of view of international law, Washington 
intends to introduce humanity to a new type of war in international law.  For the first time in 
history, war is a global world war.40 
 
 
Nuremberg and the Tragic Limits of International Law 
What should we make of these claims?  As various commentators have pointed out, 
the obvious problem with Schmitt’s narrative is that it suggests that it was the United 
States who unilaterally transgressed and discredited classical doctrines of war, 
diplomacy and international law by declaring war on Germany in 1941.  By 
emphasising the moralisation of the political at the heart of America’s discourse on 
war, and associating it with changes in technologies of warfare, Schmitt implicitly 
normalises Hitler’s genocidal war in Europe as a classic conflict of ‘reason of state’ 
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fought between Großräume. It is almost as if the war of extermination fought by the 
Nazis and the Wehrmacht had nothing to do with America’s appropriation of the just 
war paradigm as a framework to address these atrocities.41   
This seriously undermines the analytical credibility and ethical status of 
Schmitt’s critique.  Yet it is important that we do not reduce our assessment of 
Schmitt’s enterprise to this apparent normalisation of Nazi atrocities, lest we will fail 
to understand the nuances, ambiguities and continued significance of his analyses 
despite their dubious motivations and conclusions. Further insights can be gleaned 
from Schmitt’s reflections on the Nuremberg trials.   
Here again, Schmitt seems a lot more anxious to debunk Allies justifications of 
the Nuremberg criminalisation of warfare than he is with acknowledging the ‘rights’ 
of the victims of Nazi atrocities.  Whenever he refers to the participation of the 
Wehrmacht in the mass killings of civilians and the Holocaust, he primarily does it to 
draw a distinction between the undeniable guilt of the German high command and the 
much more ambiguous responsibility of ‘ordinary Germans’ who were only indirectly 
or passively involved.    According to Schmitt, international law could not possibly 
expect civilians to make their own judgement on ‘just’ and ‘unjust’ wars and commit 
treason against their own country simply by fear of being prosecuted for complicity in 
war crimes.42  For those who contemplated treason or resistance against their own 
state at the time had absolutely no legal reason to expect significant protection from 
international institutions.  Non-resistance to the Nazi leviathan may well have been 
cowardly, but it was certainly not the same as collaboration and could hardly be 
treated as an aggressive crime. If Nazi Germany was condemned for walking over the 
1907 Hague Convention on the laws of war, then the victors also had to comply to the 
terms of the said Convention that they were enforcing.43  
As Schmitt saw it, the fundamental problem with Nuremberg was that the trials 
had been instituted so as to exclude the possibility of ascribing responsibility for the 
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causes of the war, and to criminalise the ‘aggression’ as such.  This amounted to a 
politically motivated de-politicisation of legalism that would have serious debilitating 
consequences for the future credibility of international law. Although Schmitt denied 
all legal plausibility to Allies accusations concerning Germany’s war motivations and 
responsibility, he agreed unreservedly that Germany had to be punished for the 
Holocaust and traditional crimes of war.   But while traditional war crimes could be 
dealt with under the existing laws of war, he insisted that the violence of the Holocaust 
exceeded the scope of existing categories of positive public and international law.  
Instead, Schmitt argued that the atrocities committed by Hitler’s regime were so 
overwhelmingly extreme that SS and Gestapo high commands had to be brought 
before a tribunal to be condemned and punished very publicly on a moral rather than a 
juridical basis: ‘There are problems for which Themis has no scale…  The problem at 
Nuremberg was not to do with law as such, but with the limits of what men have a 
right to affirm as a right by means of a trial’. 44  
Schmitt sensed Justice Jackson’s unease concerning the juridical process over 
which he presided.  For when establishing collective responsibility for such large-
scale atrocities, no one can rest satisfied with the fact that the victors simply dictate 
their laws to the defeated.  Schmitt understood the situation as a radical expression of 
the liminal dilemmas of the German idealist tradition.  If it is the case that the victors 
dictate their laws to the defeated, and if the defeated simply accept this dictate 
submissively, then relations between victors and the defeated are nothing but 
meaningless relations of factual material power.  On the other hand, if one is serious 
about the ideals invested in a given conflict, one must submit to the potentially 
suicidal either-or a priori logic inherent to all ideals, lest one abandons these ideals to 
a nihilistic, positivistic neutralism.  While recognising German guilt, Schmitt 
constructed this guilt against the tragedy of the human condition.  He saw this tragic 
sense of life as a characteristic feature of the German self-understanding, and from 
which one could derive a certain right to political ‘error’ that was a lot more human 
than the self-aggrandizing human rights discourse of his accusers:  
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Empedocles’ death, his heroic descent into the solar fire of the earth, and the releasing of 
atomic energy (that is to say unconstrained solar energy), these are one and the same thing.  
This is enlightenment philosophy, or the philosophy of the German spirit.  It is in its name 
that the world conducts against us, we who anticipated this disaster, an idiotic war morally 
just.45   
 
Unlike what Jürgen Habermas has argued in an influential critique of his right-
wing compatriot, Schmitt’s position is therefore not that there exist no legitimate 
elements of normative universalism in world politics that can serve as a basis for 
social and moral criticism.46  On the contrary, the problem is that there is too much of 
it.  Because no one can ‘know’ with certainty what these universals are, and how they 
should guide collective action, political communities will consciously or 
unconsciously mobilise universal moral tropes for their own particular political 
purposes.  Given the legal difficulties associated with the lack of clear definition, 
sanctions, and organisational means of enforcement in international relations, Schmitt 
believed that the procedural rationalism of the Jus Publicum Europaeum constituted a 
better source of restraint against the tendency of substantive philosophical 
universalisms to degenerate into parochial irrationalism.  
 
 
Technology and the Cold War  
Schmitt’s claim that America’s rendition of the just war tradition expresses a new 
ideological phenomena attending to the technological development of contemporary 
means of violence must be read in the context of this distinctively German strain of 
political realism.  Always implicit but never clearly stated in his polemics, the full 
force of Schmitt’s thesis rides on the critique of technology that he developed during 
and after the First World War, and which spurred a important three-way exchange 
with his friends Martin Heidegger and Ernst Jünger during the 1920s and 1930s.47 
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Without going into the specific terms of agreement and disagreement of this 
exchange, the main thesis common to all three authors is that the seemingly neutral 
and soulless character of techne and mechanics is in fact driven by an anthropocentric 
metaphysics of control, production and distribution/redistribution which is rife with 
violence and antagonistic potential.  This diagnosis hinges on the claim that 
technology is not only about material artefacts such as transportation, computing and 
communication ‘systems’ and ‘machineries’.  More fundamentally, it is a way of 
thinking in which humanity itself becomes absorbed as a source of supplies into the 
technical web of valuation, calculation and exchange that is the world as resource for 
exploitation, management and manipulation.  Jünger gives the definitive statement in 
his famous interwar essay, ‘Total Mobilisation’: 
 
The era of the well-aimed shot is already behind us. Giving out the night-flight bombing 
order, the squadron leader no longer sees a difference between combatants and civilians, and 
the deadly gas cloud hovers like an elementary power over everything that lives. But the 
possibility of such menace is based neither on a partial nor general, but rather a total 
mobilization. It extends to the child in the cradle, who is threatened like everyone else even 
more so.   
 It suffices simply to consider our daily life, with its inexorability and merciless discipline, 
its smoking, glowing districts, the physics and metaphysics of its commerce, its motors, 
airplanes, and burgeoning cities. With a pleasure-tinged horror, we sense that here, not a 
single atom is not in motion-that we are profoundly inscribed in this raging process. Total 
Mobilization is far less consummated than it consummates itself; in war and peace, it 
expresses the secret and inexorable claim to which our life in the age of masses and machines 
subjects us.48 
 
Shortly after the American landing in North Africa in November 1942, Jünger 
wrote in his diary that the violence and animosity of the Second World War was a lot 
more intense than what he had experienced in the trenches during the First World 
War.  Whereas WWI was fought over the metaphysics of the European nation-state, 
WWII felt more like a ‘universal civil war’ (Weltbürgerkrieg).49   Schmitt had 
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developed the notion of universal civil war a few years earlier.50  In the conservative 
literature during the Cold War, the term universal civil war would often be used to 
discredit revolutionary hopes and activities, suggesting that the latter could never 
achieve their unrealistic aims and instead only fomented the prospects of endless 
violence.51  But for Schmitt as for Jünger at the time, what also gave the Second 
World War the apparent quality of a universal civil war was the fact that the war 
stemmed from conflicts between imperial powers, which had been forced by 
increasing interdependence to preside ‘together’ in supranational institution over the 
dissolving of the Westphalian system of sovereign states into one single post-national 
normative order.  As in civil war, what was at stake in the struggle between the mass 
ideologies of fascism, Bolshevism and liberalism was the nature of the social bond 
that would unite this emerging supranational polity.  And because in an undivided 
polity only one party can hold a monopoly on legitimate violence, the defeated party 
must either be completely subdued or destroyed.  This inevitably raised the stakes of 
the conflict as it implicitly ruled out the possibility of any compromise that might 
have allowed for the continued co-existence of the warring factions.52  As Schmitt 
explains in the Nomos: 
 
Civil War has something gruesome about it.  It is fraternal war, because it is pursued within a 
common political unity that includes also the opponent, and within the same legal order, and 
because both belligerent sides absolutely and simultaneously affirm and negate this common 
unity.  Both consider their opponent to be absolutely and unconditionally wrong.  Both reject 
the right of the opponent, but in the name of the law.  Civil war is subject essentially to the 
jurisdiction of the enemy.  Thus, civil war has a narrow, specifically dialectical relation to 
law.  It cannot be anything other than just in the sense of being self-righteous, and on this 
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basis becomes the prototype of just and self-righteous war.53  
 
Roosevelt and Churchill’s insistence on the ‘unconditional surrender’ of the 
Axis Powers at the Casablanca Conference of January 1943 confers a certain 
plausibly to Schmitt’s theses.  The most famous early use of the notion of 
‘unconditional surrender’ goes back to the 1862 battle of Fort Donelson in the 
American Civil War, during which Brigadier General Ulysses S. Grant stated that ‘no 
terms except an unconditional and immediate surrender’ of the southern states can be 
accepted.54   Like Jünger, Schmitt was perfectly aware of this precedent.  What both 
men would come to realise during the early 1940s is that America’s discriminatory 
war discourse was an ideological offshoot of the totalizing way of war developed 
during the American Civil War of 1861-1865.  As one historian reminds us, the 
American Civil War contained practically all of the technological ingredients 
accounting for the total character of the First and Second World War: ‘the 
mobilizations by railroad, the massive armies sent into battle, the automatization of 
killing resulting from the invention of the machine gun, the ambushes carried out by 
lurking submarines, the involvement and suffering of the civilian population, above 
all the fusion of warfare and economic productivity’. Nineteenth century Europeans 
were very much aware of these developments.  But the significance and implications 
of this ‘New World’ phenomenon did not really begin to sink in until the Franco-
Prussian War of 1870-71, which effectively ended the strategic culture forged by the 
Restoration of 1815.55 
Yet it is important to understand that Schmitt’s global civil war discourse is not 
a claim that geopolitics since the First World War could plausibly be read as a 
continuous internationalised civil war, as in Ernst Nolte’s revisionist history of the 
twentieth century.56   Rather, Schmitt mobilises the language of global civil war to 
highlight the fact that classical conceptual categories of warfare have lost their 
normative force and explanatory power in the historical period of transition that we 
have come to associate with ‘globalisation’.  What Schmitt perceived better than 
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anyone else at the time is that the techno-militarization weaved into the socio-
economic and political fabric of American foreign policy was transforming the role of 
imperial military force.  Thanks to the superseding of naval power by air power, force 
would no longer be deployed to achieved clearly defined expansionist objectives, but 
for the indefinite objective of policing the globe in the name of abstract ideals and an 
abstract system of economic exchange that were in the process of stripping 
humankind of all its concrete ties to the earth:  
 
My Nomos of the Earth is arriving at an appropriate historical juncture.  The time is coming 
(Nietzsche said in 1881-1882) when the struggle for the domination of the earth will be 
fought; it will be fought in the name of fundamental philosophical doctrines; i.e. an 
ideological battle for unity.  The Kellog Pact is opening a free path; war as a means of 
rational politics is despised, condemned; war as a means of global domination of the earth is 
the just war.  As Martin Heidegger argues, the world becomes object.57 
 
 
Into the Abyss of Total Devaluation 
Schmitt’s reference to Nietzsche and Heidegger in this diary entry from August 1950 
announces another important twist that he is about to incorporate into his narrative in 
the coming decade.  This concerns the rhetoric of ‘values’ that became so central to 
the ways in which the US and the USSR articulated their conflict over ‘fundamental 
philosophical doctrines’ during the Cold War.  The key text here is a relatively 
unknown treatise that he wrote as a rejoinder to a conference paper given by his friend 
the conservative jurist Ernst Forsthoff on ‘Virtue and Value in the Theory of the 
State’ in 1959.  Schmitt wrote another version in 1967, which was then re-printed 
with the original in 1979 as a small book entitled The Tyranny of Values.58   There, 
Schmitt draws on Heidegger’s philosophical critique of values to construct a political 
critique of values linking back to his earlier discourse on technology and the just war 
doctrine.   
As is widely acknowledged in the specialised literature, the modern language of 
values began to emerge in the mid-nineteenth century as an attempt to carve a space 
for freedom and moral responsibility in the face of rapid scientific modernisation.  It 
did this mainly by opposing a realm of ideal valuations based on ‘Weltenschauungen’ 
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(comprehensive worldviews) to an objectivist scientific realm of being in which 
everything is causally understood. 59   Like most observers during this period, 
Heidegger reads Nietzsche’s re-valuation of all values as the definitive hinge between 
the nineteenth and twentieth century in this respect.  Although he is in many ways 
sympathetic to Nietzsche’s project, Heidegger argues that Nietzsche’s uncritical 
appropriation of the language of values to confront the European crisis of nihilism had 
only succeeded in prolonging the agonising decline of the West.60       
Without going into the fine details of Heidegger’s analysis, the main issue is to 
do with the subjectivism by which values are called into being.  Under the sway of 
modern physics and mathematics, subjectivism conceives of reality as a series of 
categories that the human subject has deliberately constructed and meaningfully 
projected onto the world.  In doing so, subjectivism ‘forgets’ that beings always 
reveal themselves to us as meaningful before we make any value judgements about 
them: ‘In interpreting, we do not, so to speak, throw a “signification” over some 
naked thing which is present-at-hand, we do not stick a value on it; but when 
something within-the-world is encountered as such, the thing in question already has 
an involvement which is disclosed in our understanding of the world, and this 
involvement is one which gets laid out by the interpretation’.61   
For Heidegger then, the problem is not to do with whether or not men should 
estimate certain normative goods over others (of course they should).  Rather, the 
issue is that by elevating our insight into reality by considering it as ‘value-ladden’, 
we misconstrue everything that is not human (i.e. nature) in terms of a valueless and 
static realm of things.   In doing so, we deracinate ourselves from Being as a dynamic 
event of self-emerging presence.  As Heidegger explains in his ‘Letter on Humanism’ 
(1947), to assign value to something is to rob it of its worth, insofar as ‘what is valued 
is admitted only as an object for man’s estimation.  But what a thing is in its Being is 
not exhausted by its being an object, particularly when objectivity takes the form of 
value.  Every valuing, even where it is values positively, is a subjectivizing. It does 
not let beings: be.  Rather, valuing lets beings: be valid – solely as the objects of its 
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doing’.62   And so because the goal of this cognitive process is ultimately to control 
and use the material universe, subjectivism is not so much the antithesis of scientific 
objectivism as a more extreme form of nihilistic objectification.  It is the very core of 
a modern scientific worldview in which ‘[v]alue and what is valuable are turned into a 
positivistic substitute for the metaphysical’.63 
Heidegger rarely ever mentions Weber by name in his published writings.  But 
it is obvious that Weber’s famous distinction between scientific observation and 
subjective valuation based on worldviews is one of the main targets of his invectives 
against value thinking.  Schmitt picks up on this in order to read his own provocative 
Hobbesian narrative into Weber’s Vocation Lectures.  According to Schmitt, 
Weberian political sociology constitutes the most insightful demonstration of the 
latent political violence nested in the elusive ontology of values.  What Weber made 
clear for us is that since values are in fact only acts of valuation based on either 
tradition or charisma, their psychological and socio-cultural significance is nil unless 
they are accepted by others: ‘Value must continuously valuate, that is to say, it must 
bring its influence to bear: otherwise it dissolves into an empty manifestation’.64   
For Schmitt then, the issue is not only that values presuppose an endless 
possibility of self-referential appraising positions: standpoint, viewpoint, vantage 
point, starting point etc.  More fundamentally, it is that this pluralism is constantly 
abstracted and re-abstracted from the empirically determined position of individuals 
who, in reality, cannot valuate without simultaneously de-valuating in accordance 
with their own perceived interests: ‘Whoever sets a value, takes position against a 
disvalue by that very action.  The boundless tolerance and the neutrality of the 
standpoints and viewpoints turn themselves very quickly into their opposite, into 
enmity, as soon as the enforcement is carried out in earnest. The valuation pressure of 
the value is irresistible’.65  According to Schmitt, this is why Weber’s famous 
distinction between an ethics of responsibility (in which the political actor is primarily 
concerned with costs, and takes personal responsibility for the ‘foreseeable results’ of 
his action) and an ethics of conviction (in which the political actor pursues certain 
ends or ideals, regardless of the cost) had proven to be completely untenable in the 
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technological context of the twentieth century:  
 
the absolute value-freedom of scientific positivism is circumvented, and values are set free 
from it, in the opposite direction, namely, of the subjective world outlook. The genuinely 
subjective freedom of value-setting leads, however, to an endless struggle of all against all, to 
an endless bellum omnium contra omnes.  In such circumstances, the very presuppositions 
about a ruthless human nature on which Thomas Hobbes’ philosophy of the state rests, seem 
quite idyllic by comparison. The old gods rise from their graves and fight their old battles on 
and on, but disenchanted and, as we today must add, with new fighting means that are no 
longer weapons, but rather abominable instruments of annihilation and processes of 
extermination, horrible products of value-free science and of the technology and industrial 
production that follow suit.66 
 
The reader perhaps sees where this is going.  Because values are a form of 
secularised religious commitments but without the ontological clarity of theology, 
Schmitt argues that the techno-liberal resurrection of the just war tradition in the guise 
of values has rendered ideological conflicts ‘more ghostlike and the fighters more 
dogmatic’ than they ever were in the past.  For if the abstract pluralism of values is 
inherently prone to degenerate into concrete relations of enmity, just war campaigns 
are inherently prone to degenerate into relations of total enmity: ‘That lies in the 
nature of the thing itself.  All respect for the opponent disappears — well, it turns into 
a disvalue — whenever the struggle against the opponent is a struggle for the highest 
value.  Disvalue has no rights over value, and there is no price too high to pay in order 
to force the highest value through’.  In this setting, all mediating criteria of both jus 
ad bellum and jus in bello fall ‘hopelessly victim to this valuelessness.  The urge to 
make values prevail becomes a coercion to enact values directly’.67  
Schmitt saw post-WWII America as the main symbol and vehicle of the techno-
nihilism of values afflicting Western civilisation.  Like Heidegger, he associated the 
scope, pace and intensity of the Cold War with the spaceless, ahistorical character of 
American narratives of identity.68  While insisting on the analogous uses and misuses 
that the two superpowers made of international legality in the name of humanity as a 
whole, Schmitt saw that the revolutionary character of American universals differed 
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significantly from the universals of both the French and Bolshevik Revolutions.   
Whereas the continental revolutions were driven by a historical telos rooted in a pre-
existing political order that needed to be transformed, America invented a new order 
out of itself.  The United States certainly possessed a chronicle of past events.  But as 
an order of human and civil rights America had neither history nor ties to any spatial 
order.  It was the ultimate utopia – literally, a ‘no place’.  Schmitt’s point, of course, 
was that in reality the American utopia was just like any other legal-normative orders, 
underpinned by an original act of land appropriation, division and redistribution.  Its 
projection onto the rest of the world after the Second World War was a reflection of 
this reality – a continuation of the logic of land and sea appropriation underpinning 
the Monroe Doctrine in the guise of industrial appropriation:  
 
If you ask me what is the present nomos of the earth, I will answer without hesitation: it is the 
division and redistribution of the earth into industrially developed regions and 
underdeveloped regions, knowing that we must ask ourselves who offers development aid to 
whom and who accepts it from whom…  It has its primary official source in article 4 of the 
Truman Doctrine expounded on 20 January 1949, which explicitly institutes this division 
while solemnly proclaiming that the industrial development of the earth is the plan and the 
goal of the United States.69    
 
As for Soviet Russia, Schmitt believed that the alleged internationalism of the 
Eastern Bloc had never been anything else than a schizophrenic form of Soviet 
nationalism.  On the one hand, this nationalism could only legitimise itself at home 
and abroad by virtue of its professed revolutionary enmity towards the liberal 
bourgeois values of the West.  On the other hand, concrete differentials of power 
meant that Soviet foreign policy was factually driven by anxious efforts to find 
grounds for accommodation with the US.  The aim was to share into the governance 
of this emerging liberal international order through the principle of ‘spheres of 
influence’.  This was not exactly the Entente Cordiale.  But it was enough to prompt 
Stalin to intervene to prevent the success of communist revolutions in Greece and in 
Spain, and to sign a treaty of friendship with the anti-communist regime of Chiang 
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Kai-shek.  The Tito-Stalin and Sino-Soviet splits, as well as the indecisive character 
and outcome of the Berlin Crisis and the Korean War were all manifestations of this 
pseudo-universalism.  Although the genuine risk of a global revolutionary civil war 
had all but completely disappeared, the ideal could still serve as a pressure point in 
negotiations with the West.70   
Thus unlike many other realist analysts of the Cold War at the time, Schmitt did 
not associate the danger of nuclear annihilation with the security dilemma attending to 
the anarchical structure of the international state system.  As we have seen, Schmitt 
believed that the legal-conceptual categories presupposed by such reified accounts of 
international anarchy had become a thing of the past.  For him, what had become truly 
decisive since 1945 was the ‘abyss of total devaluation’ latent in the cultural fabric of 
globalising liberal modernity, which along with the disorientation of the theatres of 
war risked exceeding the rational limitations of the ‘belligerent peace’ cultivated by 
superpowers and  supranational institutions.  The danger here did not reside strictly in 
the disunity and devaluation intrinsic to the unification sought by the superpowers.  It 
also stemmed from the fact that there would always exist terse powers and elements 
of resistance beyond the false East-West alternative.  Schmitt saw that it was in the 
very nature of values and the horizontal mode of network governance through which 
they were instantiated and policed that they should bring back precisely what they 
purported to transcend: hierarchy, locality and identity.  Resistance in this setting 
would take the form of the ‘partisan’ defined by his ties to soil, land and indigenous 
population and, most of all, by his irregularity and intensity: ‘The modern partisan 
expects neither law nor mercy from the enemy.  He has moved away from the 
conventional enmity of controlled and bracketed war, and into the realm of another, 
real enmity, which intensifies through terror and counter-terror until it ends in 
extermination’.71  As modern relationships of protection and obedience dissolved in 
the face of new technologies of aerial and nuclear warfare, police action against such 
‘criminals’ and ‘pests’ would have to be intensified, and so would the justification of 
the methods:  
 
Thus, the ultimate danger exists not even in the present weapons of mass destruction and in a 
premeditated evil of men, but rather in the inescapability of a moral compulsion.  Men who 
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use these weapons against other men feel compelled morally to destroy these other men, i.e., 
as offerings and objects.  They must declare their opponents to be totally criminal and 
inhuman, to be a total non-value.  Otherwise, they are nothing more than criminals and brutes.  
The logic of value and non-value reaches its full destructive consequence, and creates ever 
newer, ever deeper discriminations, criminalizations, and devaluations, until all non-valuable 
life has been destroyed.72   
 
 
Conclusion: Schmitt and the Contemporary American Right 
We do not have to agree with Schmitt’s nostalgic assessment of the Jus Publicum 
Europaeum to appreciate the foresight and conceptual fecundity of his analyses.  
When he wrote his treatises on values and partisan warfare in the late 1950s early 
1960s, the Algerian War, the Vietnam War and the Portuguese Colonial War were in 
full swing, and the cultural revolutions were just about to kick off.  In the United 
States this would lead to the collapse of the Cold War liberal consensus, and to the 
emergence of a whole new breed of ‘value conservatism’ that would forever change 
the face of mainstream American politics.73   
As the Economist reported on the eve of the re-election of George W. Bush in 
2004, it is in great part due to the steady rise of this so-called ‘neoconservatism’ that 
America has become so exceptional in the extent to which its politics tend to be 
determined by questions of religious and moral values rather than economics and 
traditional class politics. To be sure, the American political elites and political system 
tend to exaggerate the real extent to which these conflicts over values actually divide 
the polity.  Political pundits, journalists and party activists – all share an interest in 
narratives of division rather than unity: ‘The rise in partisanship has gone along with 
the decline of political competition, as gerrymandered safe seats proliferate and a tiny 
group of party activists gains growing leverage over the political system’.  Yet the 
reason why this is the case is that those who feel strongly about cultural values are 
increasingly the only ones motivated enough to play a sustained proactive role in the 
political arena. 74  And this, of course, was precisely Schmitt’s point.  For what is 
much less clear in all this is the ontological and epistemological status of the high 
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moral ground from which neoconservatives condemn the liberal elites that they hold 
responsible for this unravelling of the American social compact.  As Paul Gottfried 
pointed out, neoconservatives are ‘for “values” and against “relativism” while 
keeping their options open as to which values need defending’.75    
 And yet, if we put the rhetoric of ‘values’ aside for a moment, there are genuine 
affinities between our contemporary neoconservative politics and Schmitt’s own 
Weimar critique of liberal democracy.   For as in Schmitt, the ultimate aim of this 
cultural politics is to keep state and society as differentiated as possible so as to 
prevent issues of socio-economic exclusions and pluralism of interests to enter the 
realm of democratic politics.  Over the past few decades, this has taken the form of 
various campaigns against multiculturalism, feminism, ‘cultural Marxism’, 
cosmopolitanism and other post-national ideologies perceived to be weakening state 
authority, empowering minorities and undermining the hegemony of the majority 
culture.    
 That these politico-cultural reactions exhibit strong tendencies to feed into 
belligerent foreign policy programmes should not surprise us.  The sublimation of 
domestic challenges through military expeditions and foreign policy grand 
strategizing has been one of the most constant themes in the history of international 
relations.  But what reading Schmitt in this context also highlights for us is the 
important linkage between these domestic culture wars and the American Right’s 
hostility towards international law.  Beyond traditional realist concerns over the 
inexpediency of multilateral diplomacy and the lack of viable enforcement 
mechanisms, the Right has a vested interest in opposing the constitutionalisation of 
the global liberal order simply because the pluralist, procedural ethics that underpins 
the latter reduces the scope for a moralisation of politics outside of positive law.  In 
doing so, international law mines the authority of the ethnocentric universals that are 
so central to the hegemonic discourse of the majority culture and deprives the Right 
of its favourite terrain.  As we have seen in the past three decades or so, the scope of 
these sovereigntist discourses go way beyond the alleged ‘internationalisation of the 
domestic legal order’ by human rights regime and environmental protocols.  It also 
extends to a whole range of issues concerning the use of force, from the Mine Ban 
Treaty and ABM Treaty to the authority of the Security Council, the Geneva 
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Conventions and the Convention on Torture to fight terrorism.76   
 Apart from their one-sided nature, what is peculiar about these sovereigntist 
discourses is the fact that their protagonists understand them to be perfectly in line 
with America’s historical role as the main purveyor of universal values to the rest of 
the world.  As Robert Kagan so candidly explained in the aftermath of America’s 
2003 invasion of Iraq: ‘By nature, tradition, and ideology, the United States has 
generally favored the promotion of American liberal principles over the niceties of 
Westphalian diplomacy.  Despite its role in helping to create the UN and draft the UN 
Charter, the United States has never fully accepted the organisation’s legitimacy or 
the charter’s doctrine of sovereign equality’.77  
It is this disregard for ‘European style’ procedural diplomacy that constitutes 
the main difference between Schmittian internationalism and neoconservative 
internationalism.  Neoconservative discourses link American sovereignty with the 
self-realisation of an historical community of ‘values’ by affirming the ethnocentric 
universals of the majority culture over the formal processes of legality and interests 
mediation that endow international norms with a minimum of universal validity.  As 
we have seen in the context of the war on terror, this tends to generate a particularly 
aggressive and totalising form of internationalism that is radically anti-pluralist both 
inside and outside the state and leaves no possibility for dissent to find any legitimate 
form of expression.  This is a crusading form of conservatism that thrives on the 
cultivation of otherness and enmity while at the same time seeking to overcome all 
estrangement from the ‘other’ by putting enemies beyond the realm of humanity and 
cultivating contempt for dissenting friends and allies who challenge unmediated 
expressions of ‘American values’. 
Barack Obama’s defence of the just war tradition to announce the escalation of 
the war in Afghanistan in his Nobel peace prize acceptance speech in December 2009 
also highlights the continued relevance of Schmitt’s analyses beyond the Bush 
presidencies. To be sure, Schmitt’s geopolitical distinction between land and sea has 
long dissolved into an a-spatial globalization, in which drones controlled by computer 
geeks sitting in an Oklahoma basement are used for manhunts in the same 
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mountainous caves that witnessed the Great Game a hundred years ago.  Civilians in 
these new conflicts are no longer just suffering wars, but are also fighting them.  One 
could also add that ‘partisan’ resistance to imperial universals in this globalised order 
can no longer be understood in terms of its ties to the land and locality.   For the 
transnational network governance structure of most prominent terrorist and ‘irregular’ 
organisations these days simply mirror the political order that they seek to negate.   
Yet none of this seems to have diminished the relevance of the main provocation 
underlying Schmitt’s US foreign policy narrative.  And that is the possibility that the 
barbarian fury of organisations such as al-Qaeda and ISIS is not the extrinsic other of 
the liberal peace forged during the American century but a constitutive expression of 
its own nihilistic telos.  
